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This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1998-1999 European Forum 
programme on Recasting the European Welfare State: Options, Constraints, Actors,
directed by Professors Maurizio Ferrera (Universities of Pavia and Bocconi, Milano) and 
Martin Rhodes (Robert Schuman Centre).
Adopting a broad, long-term and comparative perspective, the Forum will aim to:
■ scrutinize the complex web of social, economic and political challenges to contemporary 
European welfare states;
■ identify the various options for, and constraints on institutional reform;
■ discuss the role of the various actors in promoting or hindering this reform at the national, 
sub-national and supra-national level;
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In the past twenty years rising income inequality has become a persistent feature of 
most rich industrialized countries, calling for exploratory and explanatory research.2 
In view of the negative implications of inequality growth for health, crime and 
education,3research on income inequality in liberal democracies seems to be 
particularly urgent.
Yet political economists have paid remarkably little attention to distributive 
issues.4 Perhaps thirty years of economic prosperity have deflected their interest 
away from these issues, but they are hard to ignore today after two decades of 
upward inequality movements in Western countries. Studies of income distribution 
demonstrate that understanding inequality trends requires an assessment of 
government behaviour.5
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the IPSA XVII Conference 17-21 August, 
Seoul,1997 and at the European University Institute, February 1999.1 have greatly benefited from 
the detailed and constructive comments of Roger Duclos-Williams. I would also like to thank 
Jens Alber, Patrick Dunleavy, Wyn Grant, Christopher Hood, Piero Ignazi, Kay Lawson, Linda 
Luckhaus, Ian McAllister, Deborah Mitchell, Michael Moran, Brendan OLeary and Campbell 
Sharman for helpful observations on previous drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply. 
A substantial revision of the paper came while I was a Jean Monnet Fellow of the European 
Forum, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute. Material from the Family 
Expenditure Survey in the United Kingdom 1986 and 1991, source: Office for National Statistics 
is Crown Copyright. It has been made available by the Office for National Statistics through the 
ESRC Data Archive and has been used by permission. Neither the Office for National Statistics 
nor the ESRC Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or the interpretation of the 
data reported here.
2A.B. Atkinson, L. Rainwater, T.M. Smeeding (1995) "Income Distribution in European 
Countries. Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study",OECD', A. Brandolini (1998) "Pareto's 
Law and Kuznets’Curve: A Bird's-Eye view of Long-Run Changes in Income Inequality", Banca 
D’ Italia, Research Department, Rome.
3 R. Wilkinson, "The Culture of Inequality", Paper presented at the Conference on Relations 
Between Social Protection and Economic Performance, European Forum, European University 
Institute, (11-12 May, 1999); I. Kawachi and B.P. Kennedy (1997) "Socioeconomic Determinants 
of Health 2 : Health and Social Cohesion: Why Care About Income Inequality?", British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 314, 1037-40; X. Sala-i-Martin (1997) 'Transfers, Social Safety Net and Economic 
Growth", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 44, 81-102.
4 See P. Hall (1997) "The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political 
Economy of the Industrialized Nations" in M.I. Lindbach and A.S. Zuckerman, (eds) 
Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture and Structure, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 174-287.
5 A.B. Atkinson (1996) "Seeking to Explain the Distribution of Income" in J. Hills (ed.), New 
Inequalities, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 19-48. A. Brandolini, Non linear 
Dynamics, Entitlement Rules, and the Cyclical Behaviour of the Personal Income Distribution, 



























































































This paper is a step towards an explanation of the redistributive impact of 
ruling parties. It proposes a new theoretical interpretation regarding some changes 
in the social security system that could have affected inequality trends in Britain in 
the 1980s. I control the validity of this interpretation by drawing on the available 
qualitative and quantitative evidence.
Several authors have underscored the potential links between social security 
benefits and income inequality. Atkinson,6for instance, found that in Britain the 
government’s decision in the early 1980s to index social security benefits to prices 
rather than to net average earnings could account for a sizeable increase in 
inequality in the mid-late 1980s. In a similar vein, Johnson and Webb have 
calculated that application of the 1979 tax-transfer system to the distribution of 
household income in 1988 could have reduced the inequality index by 3 percentage 
points.7 Direct taxes are moderately progressive but tax avoidance and 
measurements problems mean that transfer payments offer more reliable 
opportunities for redistribution.8
From the above discussion it may appear that research on income distribution 
will be intimately connected with social security policies. Yet the bulk of scholarly 
work focuses on international forces, especially trade and technological progress.9 
According to this literature, upward inequality trends are caused by a shift away 
from the demand for unskilled labour and in favour of skilled workers. This 
structural change in the labour market is apparently triggered by the liberalization 
of international trade, the diffusion of information technology and fierce 
competition from low-wage newly industrialized countries.
The main problem with this explanation is the inability to account for cross­
national variation in inequality trends. Table 1 shows that in some countries the
6 A.B. Atkinson (1993) "What is happening to the distribution of income in the UK?", 
Proceedings o f the British Academy.
7 P. Johnson and S. Webb (1993) "Explaining the growth of UK income inequality 1979-1988", 
Economic Journal, Vol. 103, 429-35. The tax system was made more regressive. There was a 
shift away from direct to indirect taxation by replacing the previous split rates of Value Added 
Tax (VAT), 8 and 12.5 percent, with a single rate of 15 percent. The Conservative government 
initially cut the top marginal tax rate on earned income from 83 to 60 percent, and later reduced 
it to 40 percent. It also cut the basic rate of income tax from 33 to 30 percent, later reduced to 25 
percent.
S. Ringen (1987) The Possibility o f Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 175.
9 R. Freeman and L. Katz (eds) (1995) Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press; A. Wood (1994) North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: 
Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World, Oxford, Clarendon Press; P. Gottschalk and T. 
Smeeding" (1997) Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality", Journal o f 




























































































upsurge was unprecedented, in others the movement was descending and yet in 
others it was stable. 10
The sharpest increase occurred in the United Kingdom where the Gini 
coefficient11 rose by 7.3 percentage points between 1979 and 1986. Considering the 
fact that income distributions change very slowly this increase must be considered 
substantial. However, income inequality continued to fall in Norway, Israel, Canada 
and France, with the percentage drop in Gini ranging from -1.3 in France to -2.5 in 
Norway. The data display a similar pattern for the Theil Index, which is reassuring 
because it demonstrates that findings are robust to the index used.12
Such variety of national experiences is prima facie evidence that inequality 
movements over the 1980s probably had a variety of causes. They suggest that 
national factors including economic climate (e.g. unemployment rate), social 
services, demographic environments as well as exposure to international trade 
helped to shape inequality outcomes.l3Distinct national experiences might also 
reflect national policy profiles, the impact of national institutions and the 
distribution of political power within a nation. To the extent that income inequality 
is declared to be driven by international economic trends, it has largely been devoid 
o f serious analyses o f its political context.14
10 Until recently comparisons of income distributions within countries and between countries 
have been hampered by the lack of comparable income data. This drawback in comparative 
distributional analyses has been partially offset by the release of the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) microdata sets. The salient feature of the LIS data is that a large number of income and 
demographic variables have been drawn from national, usually government sponsored, surveys 
and have been made comparable across the datasets. More confidence can be attributed to the 
fact that distributional outcomes are not merely the result of changing concepts and definitions 
imposed on the data. I have adjusted income in order to take account of household size and 
composition.
11 The Gini coefficient was constructed by Corrado Gini in 1925 and is now one of the most 
widely used inequality indices.
For a detailed and comprehensive treatment of the methodological and theoretical issues 
regarding the measurement of inequality see F. Cowell (1995) The Measurement o f  Inequality, 
Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf (2nd ed).
13 N. Fligstein (1998) Is Globalization the Cause o f the Crises o f Welfare States? EUI Working 
Papers, SPS No. 98/5; A. Glyn, "Internal and External Constraints" in D. Baker, G. Epstein R. 
Pollin (1998) (eds) Globalization And Progressive Economic Policy, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 391-408.
14 This criticism has also been levelled to studies of the welfare state. See M. Ferrera (1993) 




























































































Table 1. Trends in income inequality in 9 Western countries. (Household post/tax- post/transfer 
adjusted income*)
Country late 1970s 
early 1980s
mid-1980s absolute change relative
change
Gini coefficient %
Israel 33.7 33.0 -0.7 -2.1
United States 33.0 35.5 +2.5 7.0
Canada 32.4 31.1 -1.3 -4.0
France 30.8 30.4 -0.4 -1.3
Australia 30.2 30.9 +0.7 +2.3
United Kingdom 27.6 34.9 +7.3 +20.9
Norway 24.9 24.3 -0.6 -2.5
West Germany 23.0 26.4 +3.4 +12.8
Sweden 19.9 22.9 +3.0 +13.1
Theil index %
Israel 20.3 18.7 -1.6 -7.8
Canada 17.8 16.2 -1.6 -8.9
United States 18.2 21.3 +3.1 +17.0
France 18.1 17.9 -0.2 -1.1
Australia 15.0 16.1 +1.1 +7.3
West Germany 13.9 13.5 -0.4 -2.8
United Kingdom 12.7 16.5 +3.8 +29.9
Norway 11.1 10.0 -1.1 9.9
Sweden 6.8 10.0 +3.8 +47.0
Source: computed by the author from the Luxembourg Income Study. Datasets for Canada 
1975,1981; Israel, 1979,1986; United States 1979, 1986; France 1979, 1984; Australia 1981/82- 
1985/86; United Kingdom 1979, 1986; Norway 1979, 1986; West Germany 1978, 1984; Sweden 
1981, 1987. *
* Income is adjusted with the OECD equivalence scale which is one of the most commonly used 
in developed countries for distributional assessments. This scale was suggested in the OECD list 
of social indicators’(1982) and it distinguishes only between children and adults. The ’equivalent 
income’ is the standard of living available to each member of the household unit, assuming 
income pooling. Cash income is adjusted by the number of adults in a family in order to construct 




























































































Table 1.2. Average value of income components as a percentage of average gross income in 9 
Western countries.
V ariab le USA Israel Canada A u stra lia N orw ay W est
G erm any




7 5 .8 66 7 5 .5 71 6 9 .9 63 .1 72 6 3 .2 6 4 .5
S e lf-
em p l.
In co m e
6 .7 16.8 4 .5 5 .6 11.1 16.7 4 .5 12.1 3 .7
P ro p erty
in co m e
5.8 4 .4 7 .2 12.5 2 .7 1.1 2 .7 3 .6 2.7
O ccu p .
P e n s io n s
2 .6 3 .4 1.8 1.1 1.2 2 .3 2 .5 0.0 0.0*
M ark et
in com es
9 0 .8 9 0 .5 90.1 90.1 8 4 .9 8 3 .3 8 1 .7 7 8 .8 7 0 .8
C a s h
b e n e f its
8 8.5 9.1 9.3 14.1 16.5
17.2
21.2 29.
Datasets as in Figure 1. Countries are ordering according to the proportion of cash benefits in 
total income, starting from the lowest. *





























































































We know that governments may offset or exacerbate income inequality in many 
ways. They can intervene in the labour market by arranging an incomes policy, by 
setting a minimum wage or by privatizing national industries; they can modify the 
so-called social wage by expanding or contracting social services;15 and they may 
alter the tax-transfer system. Of course, an enquiry into all these spheres of 
intervention is overly ambitious. In this paper I will have to be selective and chiefly 
confine myself to explaining the ability of the Thatcher government to cut social 
security benefits.
It is not possible to read straight from changes in the distribution of a single 
income component to changes in the overall distribution. Nevertheless we are able 
to inspect different stages of the income formation process. l6To this end, Table 2 
sets out the inequality index for original income (not including transfers), l7and for 
post-transfer income between 1974 and 1991 in the UK. There are two main 
features worth noting in this Table:












1974 43.3 31.9 11.4
1979 46.9 31.5 15.4
1986 53.6 34.9 18.9
1991 53.2 38.3 14.9
Percentage change
1974-1979 +8 -1
1979-1986 + 14 +11
1986-1991 -1 +10
1974-1991 +23 +20
Source-, computed by the author from the Luxembourg Income Study.
• the Gini coefficient for original income rose almost consistently throughout 
the period and declined slightly between 1986 and 1991;
15 There are formidable problems in assessing the redistributive impact of the social wage; see 
P. Saunders (1994) Inequality and Welfare, chapter 4.
16 See J. Hills (1996) "Introduction" in J. Hills (ed.), New Inequalities, 8.
111 leave aside the contentious issue regarding the links between government policies and the 




























































































• at the same time, the Gini coefficient for post-transfer income dropped 
modestly between 1974 and 1979 but rose between 1986 and 1991.
These results indicate that up to the late 1970s cash transfers acted as a brake on 
rising inequality in the market sphere. In the 1980s, however the situation changed: 
the Gini coefficient for post-transfer income rose by 3.4 percentage points. The fact 
that the redistributive impact of transfers appears less effective in the 1980s adds 
weight to the contention that changes in entitlement and eligibility rules could have 
contributed to upward inequality trends.18
The weaker distributional role of cash transfers took place at a time when the 
pattern of income distribution in Britain was changing dramatically. The latest 
evidence of the Rowntree Inquiry into Income and Wealth Distribution in the UK, 
shows that most of the increase in income inequality occurred in the 1980s.19 
Because the rich were getting richer and the poor relatively poorer, the economic 
benefits of the Thatcher era were clearly not equally spread. 20In the light of these 
findings it seems important to examine whether political factors influenced such 
uneven distribution of costs and benefits.
The paper is divided in six sections. Section I examines available vote­
seeking explanations of income redistribution and then proposes an alternative 
view. Section II briefly sketches the policies towards low income groups 
implemented in the early 1980s. I concentrate on the first Thatcher term because, 
as I shall demonstrate, it represented a critical juncture where strategic, institutional 
and opposition effects combined to virtually eliminate internal opposition to tighter 
social security benefits. Section III explores the redistributive implications of 
internal governance. Section IV argues that asymmetries in social security benefits 
mirrored the British electoral geography. Section V looks at Opposition effects. 
Section VI summarizes the results and provides some guidelines for future research.
18 A.B. Atkinson (1996) "Seeking to Explain the Distribution of Income"; M. Evans (1998) 
"Social Security: Dismantling the Pyramids?" in H. Glennerster and J. Hills (eds) The State o f 
Welfare, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 257-307. Both Evans and Hills draw upon the Family 
Expenditure Survey.The compatibility of my findings based on the Luxembourg Income Study 
with those drawing on the Family Expenditure Survey confirms the results of a major OECD 
study that shows the proximity of estimates based on LIS and national datasets. See A.B. 
Atkinson, T. Smeeding and L. Rainwater (1995) "Income Distribution in OECD Countries: The 
evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study".
19 J. Hills (1998) "Rowntree Inquiry into Income and Wealth Distribution in the UK, the latest 
evidence".
20 A. Goodman, P. Johnson, S. Webb (1997) Inequality in the UK’, A.B. Atkinson (1993) 




























































































I. The Politics of Income Redistribution: Theoretical Perspectives
Analysts often examine the politics of income redistribution through the lens of 
proximity models or political business cycles (PBC).JI Scholars endorsing the 
Downsian framework believe that voters have specific preferences regarding 
redistributive policies, and that they select parties that are closest to their position 
in the policy space. In plurality-rule systems, if the frequency distribution of voters 
is single peaked, vote-seeking parties adopt policies close to the median voter. On 
the assumption that median voters and median income groups overlap, proximity 
models posit that middle classes benefit from redistributive efforts.21 3 Along these 
lines many scholars have conducted studies focusing on the median voter as the key 
to understanding the politics of income redistribution. 24
In Britain, however, the assumption that middle classes have benefited from 
redistribution sharply contrasts with the shrinking size of middle income groups 
over the 1980s.25 Moreover research findings show that in first-past-the-post 
systems the real contest is not for the population-wide median voter when there are
21 For a more comprehensive treatment of the party-policy link see R. Muld (1997) "Explaining 
the Party-Policy Link: Established Approaches and Theoretical Developments", Party Politics, 
Vol. 3,493-512.
22 A. Downs (1957) An Economic Theory o f Democracy, New York, Harper & Row, 114-22; 
J.M. Enelow and M.J. Hinich (1984) The Spatial Theory o f Voting. An Introduction .Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 8-14. Vote-maximising parties will not implement redistributive 
policies aimed at capturing the median voter if: a) there are multiple issue dimensions; b) there 
is a single dimension, but the frequency distribution of voters is double-peaked and 
alienation/abstentions are significant; c) there is a single dimension but differential 
alienation/abstention across two parties; d) there are more than three parties and easy entry for 
new parties.
23 G. Tullock (1983) Economics o f Income Redistribution, Boston, Kluwer, 102-6.
24 Vote seeking models of income redistribution are employed in B. Denters (1993) "The Politics 
of Redistribution in Local Government", European Journal o f Political Research, Vol. 23,323- 
42; T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1994) "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?", American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84, 600-21; J. Bishop, P. Formby, W.J. Smith (1991) "Incomplete Information, 
Income Redistribution And Risk Averse Median Voter Behaviour", Public Choice, Vol. 68,41- 
55; C.B. Colburn (1990) "A Public Choice Explanation For The Decline In Real Income 
Transfers", Public Finance Quarterly, Vol 18, 123-34; G.W. Scully and D.J. Slottje (1989) "The 
Paradox of Politics and Policy in Redistributing Income", Public Choice, Vol. 60, 55-70.
25 F.A. Cowell, S.P. Jenkins, J.A. Litchfield (1996) "The Changing Shape Of The UK Income 
Distnbution: Kernel Density Estimates" in J. Hills (ed.) New Inequalities, 49-76. These authors 
note that the UK income distribution during the 1980s does not have the standard textbook uni- 
modal shape; rather, it presents a polarized bi-modal character. This aggregate change appears 





























































































more than two significant candidates.26This was the case in Britain between 1981 
and 1983, when the Alliance was an apparently dominant force. Proximity models 
therefore seem inadequate to account for changes in social security benefits in 
Britain.
Perhaps the political business cycle best explains the impact of vote-seeking 
parties on transfer benefits.27This model assumes that the Tcey economic element in 
the electoral-economic cycle is real disposable income’.28Parties manipulate 
instruments of budgetary policies, such as taxation and expenditure, to achieve 
short-term electoral benefits. Political business cycles are typically characterized by 
spending cuts early in the term, followed by generous benefits later. The pattern is 
expected to recur cyclically, with parties deferring the costs of pre-election 
increases in the level of transfer benefits until after the election.
However, in Britain highly controversial decisions were taken in 1982 just 
one year before the general election of 1983: in June 1982 the eamings-related 
supplement for Unemployment and Sickness benefit was abolished; a few weeks 
later Unemployment Benefit and Supplementary Benefit paid to unemployed people 
(with the exception of additions for children) became taxable. These facts cast 
doubts on the explanatory power of PBC explanations for the British case.
The evident weakness of vote-seeking models could be strengthened by 
drawing upon advances in the literature on party politics. For one thing, these 
models conceive of a political party as a monolithic entity, a black box that 
mechanically filters inputs into outputs. But theoretical work on political parties has 
argued that parties are better understood as a particular type of complex 
organization comprised of many groups, subgroups and individuals.29 Within party
26 G. Cox (1997) Making Voles Count, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 231; S. Merrill, 
(1998) Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 15-28.
27 W. Nordhaus (1975) "The Political Business Cycle", Review o f Economic Studies, Vol. 42, 
169-90; L.J. Griffin, K. Leicht, "Politicizing Welfare Expenditures in the United States" in N. 
Fumiss (ed.) (1986) Futures fo r  the Welfare State, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
28 E. Tufte (1978) Political Control o f the Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 29.
29 J. Roemer (1999) "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation", 
Econometrica, Vol. 67, 1-19; M. Maor (1998) Parties, Conflicts, and Coalitions in Western 
Europe, London, Routledge; H. Kjtschelt (1994) The Transformation o f European Social 
Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; M. Laver and K. Shepsle (1996) Making 
and Breaking Governments, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; K. Lawson (ed.) (1994) 
How Political Parties Work, Praeger, Wesport; A. Panebianco (1988) Political Parties: 
Organization and Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; F.P. Belloni, D.C. Beller 
(1978) Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspectives, 




























































































organizations factions strive for relative dominance and interact with each other in 
the struggle for power. In the process, governance within the party may lead to 
changes in decision making rules and in the formulation of policies.
Another key assumption of the traditional literature is the idea that public 
preferences set the public agenda. Oriented towards the paradigm of representative 
democracy and pre-given electoral constituencies conventional models stress the 
responsiveness of elected representatives to voters’ demands. In this perspective, 
ruling parties merely translate the demands of society into the decision-making 
arena.
Such demand-side models have come under heavy fire for neglecting the 
autonomy of party leaders from voters.30 1 Critics have noted that party leaders are 
not only vote-takers but actively engage in vote-making.32 They argue that political 
parties are relatively autonomous actors able to devise policy packages to mobilize 
voters and forge new constituencies, especially after major electoral defeats.
In sum theoretical developments point to the role of political slack, the 
autonomy from voters that may give party leaders a margin of freedom from voters 
and activists. Seen in this light, it is possible that politicians engage in or 
alternatively neglect income redistribution without regard to the preferences of the 
electorate.
By drawing upon this insight I examine the extent to which social security 
policies in Britain were influenced by factional strife and vote-mobilization and not 
generated entirely by pre-given socio-economic cleavages.
The paper proposes an interpretation of social security cuts during the first
R. Michels (1959) Political Parties, New York, Dover.
30 D. Brady and D. W. Epstein (1997) "Intraparty Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of 
the Modem Congress: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1980-1920", Journal o f 
Law Economics and Organization, Vol. 13, 26-49; M. McCubbins and M. Thies (1997) "As a 
Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan’s LDP", 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 293-328; F. McGillivray (1997) "Party Discipline as a Determinant 
of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs", American Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 41, 584- 
607; G. Cox and McCubbins (1993) Legislative Leviathan, Berkeley, University of California 
Press.
31 P. Dunleavy (1991) Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, London, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf; J. Aldrich (1995) Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f Political Parties 
in America, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
32 J.P. Frendreis, J.L. Gibson, L.L. Vertz (1990) "The Electoral Relevance of Local Party 
Organizations", American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, 225-35; T. Iversen (1994)"The 
Logics of Electoral Politics", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 27, 155-89; K. Janda, R. 




























































































Thatcher government that is rooted in two claims. First, internal realignments go a 
long way in explaining why the real break with the past came about in social 
security policy. I will analyse the role of these factors through the lens of actor- 
centred institutionalism, which combines a focus on strategic interaction with an 
awareness of the structural and historical context.33
Internal dynamics, however, tell only part of the story. The second claim is 
that the connection between the geographical location of the principal bases of 
poverty and the electoral geography sheds considerable light on the asymmetries 
seen in social security cuts.
II. Policies Towards Low Income Groups
It is by now clear that over the 1980s the Conservative government established new 
rules which made take-up benefit more limited and difficult. Since social security 
cuts under Conservative rule have been widely documented and analysed,34 here I 
briefly summarize the main policy changes. Doubtlessly one of the most significant 
changes was the severing of the link between wage movements and benefits in the 
early 1980s. Instead of cash benefits rising with national prosperity at times of wage 
increases, they increased only in line with price inflation. This meant that their 
value would fall in relation to the income of those in work. Because average income 
increased over the 1980s, the relative value of the basic pension fell from 47 percent 
of average income in 1983 to 37 percent in 1990, and the number of poor 
pensioners below half average income rose substantially after the mid-1980s. The 
decline in the relative value of unemployment benefit over the period since 1983 
was from 36 to 28 percent of average income. 35In addition to this between 1978-9 
and 1983-4 the number of social security claimants increased by 138.4 percent but 
spending on income-related benefits rose by only 110.6 per cent in real terms. 
Although the composition of claimants might have changed, the figures still 
indicate a real decline in the benefit per claimant.36The Social Security Act of 1986
33 F. W. Scharpf (1997) Games Real Actors Play, Colorado, Westview Press. On the variants of 
institutionalism see P. Hall and R.C. Taylor (1996) "Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalism", Political Studies, Vol.XLTV, 936-62; and R. Mute, "New Institutionalism: 
Distilling Some "Hard Core" Propositions In The Works of Williamson and March And Olsen", 
Politics, Vol 3, (1999), forthcoming.
34 M. Hill (1990) Social Security Policy in Britain, Aldershot Hants, Edward Elgar; H. 
Glennerster and J. Hills (eds) (1998) The State o f Welfare, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2nd 
ed.); D.S. King (1995) Actively Seeking Work? The Politics o f Unemployment and Welfare in the 
United States and Great Britain, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 168-73.
35 J. Hills (1998) "The Rowntree Inquiry Into Income And Wealth in The UK, the Latest 
Evidence", 33.




























































































abolished lower rate benefits that enabled those individuals not meeting the full 
contribution conditions to receive national insurance. As a result many people failed 
to qualify for national insurance benefit on account of insufficient contributions. In 
May 1986 over 800,000 of the 3 million people unemployed had insufficient 
contributions to receive any unemployment benefit.37Groups hit particularly badly 
included the young unemployed, others with variable work histories and the self- 
employed.38 During the period 1979-1988, 17 changes in the rules governing 
unemployment benefits were made, the majority of which reduced their scope and 
coverage.39In other areas the lack of change was just as important. Despite the sharp 
rise in unemployment in the early 1980s, no variations were made to the level and 
duration of unemployment benefits.
Other redistributive measures limited the availability of benefits to women 
in general, and married females participating in the labour market in particular.40 
Specific changes that increased women’s dependence and extent of gender 
inequality included variations to pensions and maternity benefits and to women’s 
eligibility to unemployment benefits. Alterations to the States Earnings Related 
Pension Scheme diminished its value for elderly women and the universal maternity 
grant was replaced in 1987 by a means tested benefit. At the same time statutory 
maternity pay was introduced to be administered by employers with a new 
qualification test which excluded large numbers of pregnant women. 4lTougher 
conditions to establish a claimant’s availability to work afflicted women with pre­
school children who had to demonstrate that they had already arrangements for 
child care before being entitled to benefits.42 In 1980 the 9 percent cutback in the 
real level of child benefit affected the standards of living of lone-mothers. These 
measures worsened the financial hardship of women because they are a particularly 
vulnerable group that experiences high poverty rates.43
This attack on the culture of dependency in general, and unemployed people 
in particular, derived from the government’s conviction that transfer benefits
and Effectiveness, WSP/9, STICERD, 30.
37 A.B. Atkinson and J. Micklewright (1989) "Turning the Screw: Benefits for the Unemployed 
1979-1988" in A. Dilnot and I. Walker, The Economics o f Social Security, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
38 A. Goodman, P. Johnson and S. Webb (1997) Inequality in the UK, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 223-4.
39 A.B. Atkinson and J. Micklewright (1989), op. cit.
40 M. Hill (1990) Social Security Policy in Britain, Hants, Edward Elgar.
41 L. McDowell (1989) "Women in Thatcher’s Britain" in J. Mohan, (ed.) The Political 
Geography o f Contemporary Britain, London, MacMillan, 172-86.
42 H. Jone and J. Millar (eds) (1996) The Politics o f the Family, Aldershot, Avebury.
43 S. Harkness, S. Machin, J. Waldfogel (1996) "Women’s Pay And Family Incomes In Britain, 




























































































generated disincentives to work. Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
claimed that the social security system encouraged Idleness and irresponsibility’and 
thwarted virtues of hard work and drift.44Thatcher confirmed in her memoirs the 
position of the government:
Both for public spending reasons and in order to deal with the "Why Work?" problem 
(namely, the disincentive to work created by the small disparity between in-work and out- 
of-work incomes), we had already agreed to tax short-term social benefits as soon as 
possible. In the interim we decided to reduce these benefits - unemployment, sickness, 
injury, maternity and invalidity benefits - by 5 percent.45
Rather than passively responding to voters’ demands the Conservative government 
actively manipulated entitlement and eligibility rules.
This procedure was part of a broader design to reduce welfare spending. The 
Conservative manifesto of 1979 was committed to cutting public expenditure and 
to ’rolling back the state’. To be sure, welfare spending had already been curtailed 
under the Labour government in 1976-1979, after the International Monetary Fund 
made new loans conditional on the reduction of government outlays.46Hence, 
cutbacks in welfare spending were not new.
For this reason most authors are agreed that the real break with the past came 
about in social security policies.47Thatcher was distinctive because ’none of its 
predecessors had dared to cut social security spending’.48These developments were 
in stark contrast with the post-war consensus on the desirability of maintaining and 
expanding a comprehensive system of social insurance.
The notion of consensus in social security policy is a difficult one. There was 
never complete agreement between or within the main political parties, and 
differences of substance have pervaded all policy areas. In the field of social 
security, strands within the Conservative Party were critical of the whole trend to 
welfare statism, and a major area of disagreement between the two main parties was 
on social security.49
Quoted in I. Gilmour (1992) Dancing with Dogma, London, Simon&Schuster, 125.
45 M. Thatcher (1993) The Downing Street Years, London, Harper Collins Publ., 55.
46 L Hills (1998) "Rowntree Inquiry into Income and Wealth Distribution in the UK. The latest 
evidence".
47A.B. Atkinson, J. Hills, J. Le Grand (1986) The Welfare Slate in Britain 1970-1985: Extent and 
Effectiveness; R. Lister (199 l)"Social Security in the 1980s", Social Policy and Administration, 
Vol. 25, 21-33; M. Hill (1990) Social Security Policy in Britain, Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
48 The Economist, 22 December 1979, 13.
49 H. Glennerster (1998) "New Beginnings and Old Continuities" in H. Glennerster and J. Hills, 




























































































Such controversy, however, should not be overstated. Consensus had a broad 
denotation, it meant ’accommodation between different interests and values, which 
set a framework and priorities for post-war policy to which all parties in practice 
adhered. ,50For the entire post-war period British party leaders were agreed on the 
definition of poverty.5'Economic hardship was caused by a variety of factors, 
including personal misfortune, low wages, large families, disability, sickness etc., 
and the solution proposed was setting a national minimum standard of living.
Under Thatcher, however, the case for ensuring a minimum standard of 
living appeared less compelling. As discussed earlier, the Conservative government 
reduced the scope and level of social security benefits, worsening the relative 
position of beneficiaries with respect to people in work.
III. Redistributive effects of internal dynamics
A striking feature of social security policy changes under Thatcher was the relative 
lack of public attention. As analysts noted, it was a matter of concern that little by 
little the social security system had undergone major changes of principle without 
any widespread public recognition.50 12Instead macroeconomic decisions were a 
dominant media theme that observers quite understandably wished to investigate.
The emphasis placed on macro-economic policy has meant that one 
significant question has gone largely unexplored: What effect has the struggle for 
relative dominance within the Conservative party had on social security policies? 
It is well-documented that the years from 1979 to 1982 were marked by the internal 
struggle for real control of the party, a time in which contradictions and dilemmas 
were particularly acute.53Most accounts of these inner conflicts have revolved 
around macroeconomic policy disputes and have paid little or no attention to their 
redistributive impact. For example, Bulpitt stated that the dictates of party 
management ensured that a link would be made with the statecraft of monetarism.'54
Policy" in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, G. Peele, (eds) (1990) Developments in British Politics, 
London, MacMillan, 199.
50 A. Gamble (1989) "Thatcherism and the New Politics" in J. Mohan, (ed.) The Political 
Geography o f Contemporary Britain, London, MacMillan, 3.
51 K. Banting (1979) Poverty, Politics and Policy, London, MacMillan,74.
52 A.B. Atkinson and J. Micklewright (1989), op. cit.
53 B. Jessop, K. Jennett, S. Bromley, T. Ling (1988) Thatcherism. A Tale o f Two Nations, 
Oxford, Polity Press, 19.
54 J. Bulpitt (1986) "The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic Statecraft", 




























































































Thatcher reinforced this view in her memoirs by confirming that the hardest battles 
were fought around economic policy choices.55
The point to note is that economic policy decisions and social policy choices 
cannot be easily disjointed. In the words of Francis Pym, a senior Tory figure, ‘it 
[was] undesirable for any Government to make a hard and fast choice, or to appear 
to do so, between economic and social policy.’56 Why then did the Conservative 
government not pursue a sympathetic social policy in the face of growing poverty 
and income inequality? It may be that the government was prepared to put up with 
social security cuts and rising income inequality as a necessary by-product, as they 
saw it, of a more general macro-economic strategy. The priority was to bring down 
inflation even at the price of record levels of unemployment.57The 1979 budget 
reflected this strategy by embracing the monetarist doctrine, based on the firm 
control of the money supply in the medium term.
Evidence, however, suggests that apart from macroeconomic choices other 
reasons were at work in social security changes. Members of the Thatcherite 
coalition, for instance, believed that 'egalitarianism [had] accompanied Britain's 
economic decline',58 and therefore the cornerstone of the new strategy was 'to 
challenge one of the central prejudices of modem British politics, the belief that it 
is a proper function of the State to influence the distribution of wealth for its own 
sake.’59 60This strategy was reflected in the abolition of the Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of Income and Wealth in 1979 that revealed the changed priority of the 
Conservative government towards distributional issues.
Moreover, internal dissent was not soley focused on macroeconomic 
strategy. Disagreement over distributive issues was often reported by the press. In 
March 1982 The Times described how 'the Government suffered one of its biggest 
backlash revolts of the present parliament., when 13 Conservative MPs voted to 
restore the 5 per cent that was cut from unemployment benefits in 1980.,60And this 
revolt was 'the most determined piece of internal dissent Mrs. Thatcher [had] 
suffered.’61 These remarks suggest that a preliminary step in understanding social 
security cuts requires an examination of strategic realignment within the party on 
the eve of Thatcherism.62
55 M. Thatcher (1993) The Downing Street Years, London, Harper Collins Publ., 27.
56 F. Pym (1984) The Politics o f Consent, London, Hamilton, Hamish, 112.
57 M. Thatcher (1993), op. cit., 42.
58 K. Joseph and J. Sumption (1977) Equality, London, John Murray, 12.
59 K. Joseph, and J. Sumption (1977), op. cit., 1.
60 The Times. 18 March 1982.
61 Financial Times, 14 July 1982.




























































































In charting an ideological map it is useful to bring into sharp focus the 
crucial internal disputes that emerged in the early 1970s before Thatcher was 
elected at the leadership. In a detailed survey of Conservative MPs attitudes, Crewe 
and Searing found that the party organization consisted of a variety of subgroups 
but that political thinking in some subsections could be quite highly 
crystallized.63There was considerable distance on the political values of two 
ideologically opposed groups, namely the Monday Club on the Right and Pressure 
for Economic and Social Torysm on the Left. Between these sharply defined 
ideological communities, a few more flexible groupings filled the terrain, providing 
a general structure of Conservative ideology based on four pillars; progressive and 
traditional Tories on the one hand, and liberal and corporate Whigs on the other.
Progressive Torysm had paternalistic roots. It repudiated laissez-faire, 
favoured programmes for reducing the extremes of poverty and wealth and 
espoused a vision of the state as trustee for the community. Its support for the 
welfare state was closely connected to its conception of community. Traditional 
Tories, by contrast, were cynical about social planning and skeptical about the 
virtues of social progress. Their primary concern was strong government and 
leadership. The other two pillars of the Conservative ideological structure consisted 
in the Liberal and Corporate Whigs who sought to preserve private property as the 
most effective means to achieve their aims. Liberal Whigs claimed that government 
intervention distorted the marketplace and undermined economic growth, while 
corporate Whigs believed in the economic advantage derived from a close 
partnership among government, trade unions and business.
From the early 1950s to 1974 the dominant coalition within the Conservative 
Party melded elements of corporate Whiggery with progressive Toryism. But 
Thatcher ascendency to power hinged on an alternative alliance which connected 
liberal, free enterprise Whiggery with traditional, authoritarian Toryism.64 This 
internal realignment brought to the fore Tory leaders less sympathetic to the welfare 
state than the previous ones. Jim Prior, a member of the old coalition, believed that 
the new alliance espoused ’a very simplistic approach...In a world increasingly 
interdependent and with a people used to a welfare state, it looked an unpromising 
scenario.’65After the advent of Thatcher to power the ideological chasm within the 
Conservative Party was often depicted as a battle between two camps, the pre-
Norton (1981) Conservative and Conservatism, London, Temple Smith, 53-89.
63 I. Crewe and D. Searing (1988) "Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party", 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, 361-84.
641. Crewe and D. Searing (1988) "Ideological Change In The British Conservative Party"; S. 
Smith and M.J. Ludham (eds) (1996) Contemporary British Conservatism, London, MacMillan, 
4-12.




























































































Thatcherite coalition, the so-called ‘wets’ and the alternative alliance, the so called 
‘dries’. Thatcher wrote in her memoirs that ‘decisions came to be seen as victories 
by one side or the other.’66 She described 'the passionate and obstinate resistance 
mounted by the 'wets' to the fiscal, economic and trade union reforms of the early 
1980s.’67 This dualism was reported by the press: 'Mrs. Thatcher was particularly 
infuriated at having to make "wet" decisions at the last minute to pull the 
government back from what seemed a certain short-term disaster.’68Yet the 
distinction between wets and dries is clearly an overly simplified account of the 
variety of Conservative dispositions. It attributes a consistency, coherence and unity 
which is hard to reconcile with the amalgam of interests found in the Conservative 
Party. However, for analytical convenience analysts often describe the internal 
battle under Thatcher in terms of a struggle between the ‘wets’ and the ‘dries’.69 I 
follow this convention, and in doing so I cannot do justice to the richness and 
complexity of Conservative belief.
A key point to note is that the ‘dries’ were a dominant minority. Few would 
deny that Thatcher was elected not because there was an extensive commitment to 
her views but rather because she was the only serious candidate willing to challenge 
Heath.70 Estimates of the proportion of Thatcherites on the eve of the leadership 
contest in 1975 indicate that her supporters ranged between 10 and 25 percent.71 
Minority groupings are sometimes more radical than majority ones because 
purposive incentives develop to compensate for other incentives controlled by the 
larger group.72
Thus, the minority status of the dries probably enhanced their ideological 
spurt, so unusual among Conservative leaders. Radical policies go deeply against 
the grain of Conservative thinking, which was traditionally tinged with moderate
66 M. Thatcher (1993) op. cit., 130.
61 M. Thatcher (1993) op. cit., 105.
68 The Economist, October 1981.
69 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh (1984) The British General Election o f 1983, London, MacMillan, 
32; J. Douglas (1989) "Review Article: The Changing Tide - Some Recent Studies of 
Thatcherism”, British Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 19,409; P. Riddell (1983) The Thatcher 
Government, Oxford, Robertson, 46; C. Boix (1998) Political Parlies, Growth and Equality, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
70 A. King (1985) "Margaret Thatcher: The Style of a Prime Minister" in A. King (ed.) The 
British Prime Minister, London, MacMillan, 97; P. Riddell, The Thatcher Government, Oxford, 
Robertson, 21; R. Shepherd (1991) The Power Brokers, London, Hutchinson, 176-7.
The classification of Thatcherites was based on responses on three values: strong government, 
free enterprise and discipline. See I. Crewe, D.D. Searing (1988) "Ideological Change in the 
British Conservative Party", 371.





























































































tones. Margaret Thatcher was a Conservative rarity in her readiness to identify 
Conservatism in unambiguous ideological terms. ,73The crusading fervour of the 
dries also helped cement their internal divisions. A large number of Conservative 
figures, such as Rhodes Boyson, Lord Beloff, Paul Johnson, Alfred Sherman, Alan 
Walters, had changed their political allegiances at least once before, and hence 
might be expected to do so again.73 4These people had been recruited from varying 
sources, some had been Liberals, others Labour supporters. Since their beliefs were 
shaped more by their antipathies than by a common positive vision, the need for a 
constant unifying enemy was particularly urgent for them.’75Intemal rivals were 
instrumental to the viability of the dry coalition. Hence the struggle for power inside 
the Conservative Party was an important factor in the new direction of social 
security policy.
Divisions inside the Cabinet grew steadily worse and much of the debate 
centred on public expenditure. 76Prior’s reaction to the 1979 Budget eloquently 
expressed this dissension: It was really an enormous shock to me that the budget 
which Geoffrey [Howe] produced the month after the election of 1979 was so 
extreme’.77As the economy slumped and unemployment soared the government’s 
stubborn concern with inflation and the minimalist state provoked an outright revolt 
within both the Cabinet and backbenchers. In 1981 the unemployment rate stood at 
13 percent and most Cabinet members were expecting less stringent monetary rules. 
The budget aroused open dissent among many Tory leaders. Even Tomeycroft, 
Thatcher’s own choice as party chairman, sided with the dissidents and was 
removed before the Annual Conference held in Blackpool in 1981.
The Blackpool Conference displayed the two faces of a divided cabinet. 
Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, criticized the right-wing 
emphasis on independence and self help because ’self help [had] a limited meaning 
in an inner city community where 40 percent of the young kids may be without 
work’. 78Controversy over the relationship between the Conservative Party and sub­
sections of the population was sparked by different opinions regarding the party
73 P. Whiteley, P. Seyd and J. Richardson (1994) True Blues: the Politics o f Conservative Party 
Membership, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 127.
74 A. Denham, M. Garnett (1994) "Conflicts of Loyalty": Cohesion and Division in 
Conservatism, 1975-1990" in P. Dunleavy, J. Stanley (eds), Contemporary Political Studies, 
Political Studies Association of the UK, 270-7.
75 A. Denham, M. Garnett (1994) "Conflicts of Loyalty’: Cohesion and Division in Conservatism, 
1975-1990”, 271.
76 R. Behrens (1980) The Conservative Party from Heath to Thatcher: Policies and Politics, 
1974-1979, Famborough, Saxon House, 70.
77 J. Prior (1986) A Balance o f Power, London, Hamish Hamilton, 119.




























































































image. As mentioned earlier, hardliners wished to mould it as the party of free- 
market principles, initiative and duty; while the ‘wets’ believed that the government 
should not relinquish its responsibility for acting as a brake on income inequality.
Arguably, however, the most significant aspect of the Blackpool Conference 
was the surfacing of the dilemma of sequential elections. Before proceeding further, 
it should be noted that there are two distinct definitions of sequential elections in 
the literature. One refers to successive national elections, the other, which is less 
frequently employed, concerns elections of different types of constituencies, such 
as MPs, activists and voters. In this paper I use the second definition.
The dilemma of sequential elections surfaced in 1975 when the reselection 
rules of the Conservative leader raised her/his dependence on the party. Until then 
the leader of the Conservative Party was not subjected to reselection. From 1975 the 
Conservative leader had first to ensure re-election as leader and therefore satisfy the 
wishes of the faithful MPs. Comparative research on the leadership selection shows 
that the process of ensuring reselection may constrain the behaviour of those 
selected. Sequential elections exemplify the quandary of party leaders because in 
order to gain or retain office leaders must win the favours of different types of 
constituencies. The fact that Margaret Thatcher was directly dependent on the 
favours of the Conservative MPs heightened her sensitivity to the views of 
backbenchers, 'the probability of removal may be low; but the risks to the individual 
[leader] are high'.79 80 The uncertainty created by sequential elections emerged during 
the Blackpool conference:
The unease of Tory members of parliament [contrasted] strongly with the loyalty and 
enthusiasm of constituency delegates for Mrs. Thatcher, and more particularly for 
Thatcherism. The ..more applause she won at Blackpool the less appeal she had to the 
broader electorate watching television.81
Had the Conservative leader satisfied the wishes of moderate Cabinet ministers and 
those of the wider electorate, she would have annoyed the party's rank-and-file.
Thatcher skilfully deployed different sources of power to quell the revolt 
within the party. First, she immediately appealed to party activists in order to 
mobilize their support. In her words:
79 M. Marsh (1993) "Introduction: Selecting the Party Leader”, European Journal o f Political 
Research, Vol. 24, 229.
80 A. King (1991) "The British Prime Ministership in the Age of the Career Politician", West 
European Politics, Vol. 14, 29.




























































































The dissenters in the cabinet had been stunned by the 1981 budget proposals. It was clear 
that the Party in the country must be mobilized in support of what we were doing. The 
forthcoming Central Council of the Conservative Party provided an opportunity for me 
to do this... 1 got a good reception. For the moment at least, the Party faithful were 
prepared to take the heat and back the government.82
Such demagogic appeal to activists helped to boost the party membership, after 
years of relentless decline. Thatcher paid close attention to the rank-and-file desires 
and attitudes, and in this way she made them feel more important for the party 
organization. Since the early 1980s Conservative members have been feeling more 
influential in the decision-making process of the party organization.83 Thatcher 
gauged the mood of many Conservative activists correctly. ’Above all’, wrote the 
Times, ’Mrs.Thatcher has given voice to many grassroots Tory views about unions, 
law and order, scroungers and capital punishment.’ 84The Tory leader was especially 
popular among young Conservative members who were more committed to political 
principles. Young Conservative activists were less favourable to the redistribution 
of income and wealth and less supportive of government expenditure to relieve 
poverty.85 Therefore Thatcher was able to promote and reinvigorate the loyalty of 
party members through attacks on scroungers and on the welfare state.
Another strategy Thatcher deployed to ease internal strains was to relax 
public expenditure. Growth in government outlays in the early 1980s was 
doubtlessly the effect of automatic stabilizers, but it was also the outcome of 
discretionary policy driven by internal opposition: The relenting on cuts took some 
of the edge off the cabinet anger.. It is regarded as signalling the start of the ’wet 
appeasement.’86 A similar strategy was probably followed in 1982 when the 
Conservative government asked the Central Policy Review Staff to report on 
measures apt to resolve the problem of ever-increasing public expenditure. When 
the Policy Review proposed to dismantle the welfare state they found a determined 
rejection from cabinet members. The prime minister's press office issued a denial 
that Mrs Thatcher had anything to do with the plan.
All this means that faced with the pragmatics of power, the Conservative 
leader restrained her policy ambitions. As Shepherd remarks, Thatcher always 
tempered her radicalism with an overriding desire that the Conservatives should
82 M. Thatcher (1993) The Downing Street Tears, London, Harper Collins Publ, 138-9.
83 P. Whiteley, P. Seyd, J. Richardson (1994) True Blues: the Politics o f  Conservative Party 
Membership.
M 11 March 1986.
85 P. Whiteley, P. Seyd, J. Parry (1996) Labour and Conservative Party Members 1990-1992: 
Social Characteristics, Political Attitudes and Activities, Aldershot, Dartmouth.




























































































hold office with her as their leader.87By first appealing to the party faithful and then 
by pacifying the ‘wets’, Thatcher was able to forge an internal alliance based on 
strong vertical ties (between leaders and members) and on relatively solid horizontal 
ties (between Conservative MPs). In this way Thatcher could retain the leadership 
despite the fact that she had joined a minority coalition.
The equilibrium within the Conservative ranks, however, became gradually 
more precarious. Profound divisions over macroeconomic policies were aggravated 
by sharp differences in social security policy. Peter Bottomley, the Conservative 
MP for Woolwich West, complained that unemployment benefits were 'now worth 
less than at any time in the past decade. The last thing we can afford is to be 
accused of dishonesty.’88When 18 Conservative MPs voted against the refusal to 
restore benefits cuts in 1981, the government's majority fell to eight. Rebels 
included Dennis Waltem, Cyril Nebyon and Julian Critchley, five others abstained. 
It was clear that any further pressure would risk splitting the party asunder.
Tensions reached a climax in the summer of 1981 during the discussions 
preparing the budget. Fierce reactions to the Budget acted as a springboard for a 
Cabinet reshuffle. In September 1981 the Prime Minister dropped three well-known 
wets, Ian Gilmour, Lord Privy Seal, Christopher Soames, Leader of the Lords and 
Mark Carlisle at Education, and brought in three men on whom she could rely, 
Norman Tebbit, who was appointed Minister of Employment, Nigel Lawson, 
Minister of Energy and Norman Fowler, who became Minister of Health and Social 
Security.
Institutional effects
As the recession wore on, internal turmoil exploded and the cabinet's cohesion 
began to break down. At this critical point some key institutional features sustained 
Margaret Thatcher from losing control of policy-making. It is widely believed that 
Westminster systems concentrate a disproportionate amount of power on prime 
ministers. As Thatcher remarked, the constitutional role of UK Prime Ministers in 
appointing and reshuffling their Cabinets is 'undoubtedly one of the most important 
ways in which a prime minister can exercise power over the whole conduct of 
government'. 89Another institutional feature that helped Thatcher to marginalize 
internal dissidents was the strong institutionalization of the Conservative Party. A 
strongly institutionalized party is highly centralized and combines the major 
resources of power in the hands of the dominant coalition.90
87 R. Shepherd (1991) The Power Brokers, London, Hutchinson, 178.
88 The Times, February 1982.
89 M. Thatcher, (1993), op. cit., 25.




























































































The joint effect of Prime Ministerial prerogatives and party 
institutionalization contributed to mollify internal resistance to Thatcherite policies. 
In the end, Thatcherite ideas prevailed and social policy ceased to be a divisive 
issue among MPs.91 Hence the first Conservative term represented a critical juncture 
that set the conditions for the direction of social security policies in the 1980s.
III. Electoral Geography And Vote-Mobilization
It is important to appreciate that cutbacks to social security benefits were not 
uniformly applied to client groups. In 1981, for example, the government increased 
pensions in line with inflation plus an additional two percent for the amount by 
which 1981 ’s inflation was underestimated, whereas unemployment benefits were 
indexed without getting the extra two percent. Thus, the Conservative government 
at least ensured that the real value of pensions did not decline.92
The higher priority given to the elderly relative to other claimants is reflected 
in the consistently declining proportion of pensioners requiring means tested help 
for their living costs, which fell by 2.8 percentage points between 1979 and 
1990.93This drop was partly the result of increasing receipt of private and 
occupational pensions paid in addition to state pension. By contrast in the same 
period the percentage of unemployed with no unemployment benefit rose by 21.6 
points. 94The composition of the poorest income group shows a declining proportion 
of poor elderly over the 1980s but a higher proportion of unemployed.95 96
One explanation for this asymmetry is found in the geographical location of 
the principal bases of poverty and vote distribution. The emergence of ‘two 
nations’, with Conservative voters disproportionately living in the south and 
Labour supporters more concentrated in the north, was part of a trend that had been 
going on for twenty years. Since the mid-1960s there has been a long-term 
movement towards Labour in the north, in Scotland and in most urban areas and
91 J. Garry (1994) The Internal Politics o f the British Conservative Party and Margaret 
Thatcher’s Position as Leader, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Galaway.
92 J. Hills (1988) The Rowntree Inquiry into Income and Wealth Distribution in the UK. The 
latest evidence.
93 M. Evans (1998) "Social Security: Dismantling the Pyramids?" in H. Glennerster and J. Hills 
(eds) The Slate o f Welfare, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 275.
94 M. Evans (1998), op. cit., 278.
95 A. Goodman, P. Johnson, S. Webb (1997) Inequality in the UK, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 98-110.





























































































towards the Conservatives in the rest of England and in rural areas. This pattern 
continued in the 1980s, sharpening even further the socio-geographical cleavage 
between Conservative and Labour. Table 3 shows that the geography of voting was 
reflected in the distribution of seats in the English regions. In 1983 Conservative 
held more than seven times the number of seats gained by Labour in the south, 
whereas in the north Labour secured the majority of seats.
Table 3. Distribution of seats in the English regions* 1983
Conservative Labour Alliance
South-East 162 27 3
South-West 44 1 3
Total South 206 28 6
East Anglia 18 1 1
East Midlands 38 8 -
West Midlands 36 22 -




North West 36 35 2
Northern 18 26 2
Total North 78 89 4
* The English Regions are the eight Standard Regions as defined by the Registrar General
The electoral geography coincided with the geographical location of the principal 
bases of poverty. In the south the poor were the most likely to be elderly; poverty 
in the north was more likely to be associated to redundancy and joblessness. 7 In the 
north the number of beneficiaries grew from 15.7 percent in 1979/1980 to 20 
percent in 1983/1984, an increase of 4.3 percentage points, while in the south-east 
it increased from 9.4 percent to 9.7 percent, a rise of 0.3 points.97 8 Clearly higher 
unemployment, low paid jobs and poverty were of different magnitude and 
significance in the two regions.99
97 A. Green (1996) "Aspects of the Changing Geography of Poverty and Wealth" in J. Hills, (ed.) 
New Inequalities, 265-91.
98 A.Walker, C. Walker (1987) The Growing Divide. A Social Audit 1979-1987, 47-8;
A.E. Green (1996) op. cit., 265-92; R.J. Johnston and C.J. Pattie (1989) "The Changing Electoral 
Geography of Great Britain" in R. J. Johnston and C.J. Pattie (eds) The Political Geography o f 
Contemporary Britain, London, MacMillan, 51-68.The spatial distribution of poverty, is of 
course, more nuanced than the account offered in this paper. As the very few studies on the topic 
show, there are urban-rural differences, as well as differences between large metropolitan centres 
(cf. A.E. Green (1996) op. cit., 265-92, and M. Noble and G. Smith (1996) "Two nations? 




























































































If we look at the voting patterns among pensioners in Table 4 we note that 
between 1979 and 1987 Conservative voting among pensioners holds up at around 
47 percent while Labour voting drops by almost 13 percentage points; by contrast, 
if we inspect the voting patterns among the unemployed we see that Labour voting 
consistently rose, with an increase of about 20 percentage points during the first two 
Thatcher terms.
Table 4. Voting patterns among unemployed and pensioners. United Kingdom,
1974-1987
Feb. 1974 Oct. 1974 1979 1983 1987
Unemployed
Conservative 10.5 21.4 42.3 22.5 18.1
Labour 65.8 60.7 42.3 52.0 62.0
Lib/Alliance 18.4 10.7 15.0 23.1 18.1
Other 5.3 7.1 0.0 2.4 1.8
pensioners*
Conservative 47.2 41.6 49.7 47.3 46.0
Labour 37.4 39.9 38.0 31.2 28.0
Lib/Alliance 14.0 16.9 10.2 20.1 25.3
Other 1.5 1.6 2.1 1.3 0.8
Source: calculated by the author from I.Crewe, N.Day, A. Fox, Tlie British Electorate 1963- 
1983, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), various tables.
♦aged 65-75
This differential pattern of voting between unemployed and pensioners is puzzling. 
We have seen that both groups experienced large falls in their absolute standards 
of living; and yet Conservative voting continues to hold up among pensioners.
One way of interpreting these results is to view both the pensioners and the 
unemployed as members of risk categories. In Baldwin’s definition ‘Risk categories 
are actors identified and given interests in common by their shared relations to the 
means of security, by their stake in or against the redistribution of risk promised by 
social insurance.’100 It is reasonable to believe that pensioners compared themselves
Inequalities, 292-320. By the same token, the geographical distribution of seats is more varied 
than simple north-south, see J. Curtice and M. Steed (1984) Appendix 2: An Analysis o f the 
Voting in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election o f 1983, London, MacMillan, 
333-73.




























































































These voting patterns indicate that redistributive costs and benefits might 
have been apportioned between sub-groups of risk categories in order to mould 
electoral coalitions in specific areas of the country. We can describe this strategy 
as arithmetical particularism that relied on making sectional appeals, either to 
different social groups or to different geographical areas.10 02Arithmetical 
particularism enabled Conservative leaders to adjust social relativities by penalizing 
the unemployed while being more protective towards pensioners.
Arithmetical particularism helped Thatcher to capitalize on the different 
patterns of dependence on supplementary benefits. The north had a higher 
proportion of individuals living in poor households.103 The economically fortunate 
were instead living in the South and formed a sizeable proportion of what Galbraith 
dubbed the ’contented electorate.’l04Although the north-south divide pre-dates the 
1980s,105Walker claims that the Conservative government has helped to widen and 
deepen these divisions, sometimes to a catastrophic extent’. l06My analysis supports 
this conclusion by indicating that discretionary policies altered the economic 
realtivities between state-dependent groups living in the north and in the south.
The government not only adjusted relativities between risk categories but 
also wooed middle classes with housing policy and tax policy. Much has been 
written about how the Conservatives encouraged council tenants to buy their homes 
by offering favourable terms that presided over one of the biggest booms in the 
housing market ever experienced. 107Middle income classes benefited from taxation 
policy, especially from the shift to indirect taxation, and from access to universal
with other risk categories, such as the unemployed, and thus were less dissatisfied '
with Conservative rule.101
Stale 1875-1975, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 11-2.
101 For a different interpretation see A. Heath (ed.) (1991), Understanding Political Change, 
Oxford, Pergamon Press, 168.
102 Krieger uses the term arithmetical particularism but does not apply it to social security 
benefits. J. Kneger (1986) Reagan.Thatcher and the Politics o f Decline, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
86.
103 U.K. Borooah, P.P.L. McGregor, P.M. McKee (1991) Regional Income Inequality and 
Poverty in the United Kingdom, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 98.
104 J.K. Galbraith (1993) The culture o f Contentment, London, Penguin, 15.
105 E. Fiedhouse (1995) "Thatcherism and the Changing Geography of Political Attitudes", 
Political Geography, Vol. 14, 3-30.
106 A. Walker and C. Walker (1987) The Growing Divide. A Social Audit 1979-1987, 13.
101 R. Jowell, J. Curtice, A. Park, L. Brook, K. Thompson, C. Bryson (1997) British Social 
Attitudes. The 14th Report, Aldershot, Ashgate; P. Dunleavy, C. Husbands (1985) British 




























































































benefits.l08Social engineering thus produced a major growth in Conservative voting 
among manual worker households.
This paper adds to those works the finding that alterations in cash benefits 
under Thatcher were also politician driven. Arithmetical particularism coupled with 
the adjustment of social relativities promoted alliances between sections of the 
middle class and beneficiaries. New electoral coalitions were forged by policy 
manipulations that explicitly denied benefits to specific groups while granting them 
to other less stigmatized groups. This view supports the contention that 
Conservatives engaged in vote mobilization to build the electoral coalition that kept 
them in power.1
V. Opposition Effects
The process of coalition building among sections of the electorate was facilitated 
by weak interparty competition. Divisions within the Labour Party over proposals 
of internal constitutional change absorbed the energies of the Labourites. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s Labour’s strategy shifted further to the left. Such policy 
radicalization opened a political vacuum in the centre of the ideological space, soon 
filled by the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). For the first time, 
three national parties fought every seat. Throughout 1981 and 1982 the SDP in 
alliance with the Liberal Party produced sweeping by-election successes, and was 
an apparently dominant force in shaping public opinion. ll0Although the 
establishment of the SDP inflicted heavy damage on the Labour Party, about 14% 
of alliance voters identified with the Conservative Party and a much higher 
proportion would probably have voted straight Conservative had there been no SDP 
alternative.111 In the 1983 general election, of the supposedly most winnable eighty
108 Over the 1980s, professional and managerial classes tempered the Conservative governments’ 
attacks on the welfare state by protecting universal social services, such as the National Health 
Service. See R. Klein (1995) The New Politics o f the National Health Service, London, 
Longman; J. Le Grand and D. Winter, "The Middle Classes and the Defence of the British 
Welfare State” in R.E. Goodin and J. Le Grand (1987) Not only the Poor, London, Allen and 
Unwin, 147-69. For a different perspective see P. Pierson (1994) Dismantling the Welfare Slate? 
Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics o f Retrenchment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
and for a critique to Pierson see J. Alber, Selectivity, Universalism, and the Politics o f Welfare 
Retrenchment in Germany and the United States, paper presented at the 92nd annual meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August, 1996.
109 C. Boix (1998) Political Parties,Growth and Equality, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
1101. Crewe and A.King (1998) SDP: The Birth,Life and Death, Oxford, Oxford University Press.




























































































Entrance in the electoral arena of a new political rival tempered internal 
opposition because several Tory moderates were acutely vulnerable to the Alliance’s 
advance in their constituencies. As one observer noted, by ‘1981 an election was 
within sight, and the rise of the SDP/Liberal Alliance was worrying the wets', 
especially as many of them were, by chance, most exposed to the Alliance's advance 
in their constituencies'.113 Between 1979 and 1983 the Alliance won three out of 
four by-elections from Tory seats. In October 1981, it took the Tory seat of 
Croydon, North West; in November the by-election in the Conservative stronghold 
of Crosby produced a swing of 25 percent and returned to parliament Shirley 
Williams, a prominent leader of the SDP. In March 1982, another SDP leader, Roy 
Jenkins, gained the Tory seat at Glasgow Hillhead. This success seemed to be 
related to the moderate image projected by the Alliance. ll4Losing hope of gaining 
centrist votes, the ‘wets’ restrained their bitter rivalry. This attitude is compatible 
with research findings showing that in representative democracies when electoral 
competition intensifies, internal wrangling wanes."5
A further challenge to security of tenure in the course of the 1979-83 
parliament was the implementation of the most radical constituency boundary 
revision for over 60 years, which left only 66 constituencies completely 
unchanged.1 l6Although the boundary revisions created more seats winnable by the 
Conservative Party it destabilized the position of a number of current M Ps."7
Finally the Falklands war boosted Conservative support and established 
Thatcher in her political leadership. The landslide victory of 1983 and the demise 
of the ‘wets’ as internal opponents meant that 'the politics of interest, of faction, of 
groupings and collaborations within the party, which a leader might ignore at her 
peril, had entirely vanished’.'^Modifications in the electoral arena thus became an 
asset for Conservative right-wingers.
seats by the Alliance all but two were held by the Conservatives.112
112 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh (1984) The British General Election o f 1983, 80.
113 P. Riddell (1983) The Thatcher Government, Oxford, Robertson, 46-7.
114 J. Rasmussen (1983) "The Alliance Campaign. Watersheds, and Landslides: Was 1983 a Fault 
Line in British Politics?" in A. Ranney (ed) Britain at the Polls, 1983, Duke University Press, 
Durham, 81-107.
115 W.D. Berry and B.C. Canon (1993) "Explaining the Competitiveness of Gubernatorial 
Primaries", Journal o f Politics, Vol. 55, 454-71. L. Atkeson (1993) "Moving Toward Unity", 
American Political Quarterly, Vol. 21,272-89.
116 For this reason it is impossible to make an exact comparison between the constituencies in 
1979 and in 1983.
117 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh (1984) The British General Election o f 1983, 227.





























































































Over the 1980s income inequality in Britain grew faster than in many other 
countries, suggesting that national factors played a crucial role. This paper 
examined some of the driving forces behind changes in social security benefits. It 
offered a new interpretation regarding the redistributive role of a ruling party based 
on the notion of political slack. First, I applied the idea that the party policy link is 
intelligible primarily in the light of intraparty dynamics. By looking inside the black 
box it was possible to see how strategic repositioning within the Conservative Party 
affected changes in transfer policies. The minority status of the Thatcherites was 
one element behind their ideological drive and behind the break with the past in 
social security policies. In addition to this, the dilemma of sequential elections 
raised Thatcher’s threat perception and her dependence on backbench opinion. 
Sequential elections thus facilitated the internal compromise on social security 
benefits between 1979 and 1981. At this stage internal opposition was buoyant and 
the Thatcherites were still in quest for legitimacy, so they whittled down proposed 
benefit cuts.
My approach demonstrates that an exploration of internal governance sheds 
light on the radicalization of the ‘dries’ as well as on the sudden u-tum in social 
security policy. It shows that the assumptions of the unitary actor model neglect 
important factors such as the dynamics between minority and majority factions or 
the effects of sequential elections, and thus suggest that the model is inadequate.
A further contribution of this paper is to point out that political leaders are 
entrepreneurs endowed with a relative margin of freedom from voters. Such 
freedom enables them to design redistributive policies aimed at forging new 
coalitions of voters. In this sense redistributive policies may be politician. I argued 
that Thatcher was able to fabricate new alliances between people in work and 
pensioners by capitalizing on the geographical distribution of poverty. The 
Conservative leader engaged in sophisticated applications of arithmetical 
particularism, whereby specific state-dependent groups, such as the unemployed, 
were penalized while others were protected. The government manipulated 
redistributive policies to mobilize sections of the electorate into a winning coalition 
of voters. Thatcherism is distinctive in its dramatic illumination that leaders may 
attempt to coax the public towards themselves.
My account indicates that institutional features and opposition effects may 
sustain or constrain the relative autonomy of party leaders from voters and activists. 
The essence of the Westminster system coupled with a strong party 
institutionalization contributed to the demise of opposition within the Conservative 




























































































and helped to sanction their final defeat. The paper concentrated on the first 
Thatcher term because it represented a critical juncture where strategic, institutional 
and opposition effects combined to virtually eliminate internal opposition.
The analytical narrative presented in this paper departs from the traditional 
manner in which we have studied the phenomenon of the redistributive impact of 
parties. It points to the fact that party leaders are able to design policies that build 
or recraft public opinion in order to outflank their internal rivals as well as to 
manufacture electoral coalitions. In this way my interpretation qualifies dominant 
approaches that view redistributive policies as merely a response to pre-given social 
constituencies or explain inequality trends as solely the outcome of external 
pressures. My aspiration here is not to write a definitive account of the 
redistributive role of the Thatcher government but rather to demonstrate the 
possibility and utility of an alternative approach to understanding cuts in social 
security benefits.
May, 1999
Department of Politics and International Studies 
University of Warwick 
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